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LIABILITY OF A MqUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
.FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY
THE EXPLOSION OF A PEANUT ROASTER.
In Frank v. Village of Warsaw, 198 N. Y., 463, the plaintiff's
eyes were blown out by the explosion of a peanut roaster whichwas stationed near the curbstone in the streets of the village. Suitwas instituted by the injured party on the ground that the negli-gence of the village in failing to remove a dangerous obstructionfrom its streets had caused the injury complained of. It appearsthat although the roaster was not expressly licensed, it had beenmaintained at this particular place for several weeks; in fact longenough to be brought to the notice of the village trustees, whosefailure to object to its continued use of the place amounted to animplied approval on their part. The peanut roaster was mounted
on wheels and was operated only during business hours, as theowner also conducted a confectionery store and fruit stand in thebuilding across the sidewalk. In awarding damages to the plain-tiff the Court held that the failure of the defendant to have theroaster removed amounted to a negligence which was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury.
The exact circumstances of this particular case have of coursenever arisen before but they involve a principle that has been con-
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tinuously litigated throughout the country, leading 
to various.
decisions in different jurisdictions. The question in this case
seems to be whether or not the trustees should 
have anticipated
the possibility of the accident happening by the 
exercise of due•
care and prudence.
The decision in the principal case is based on the 
opinion ren-
dered in a leading case of the State, and a case 
that is recognized
as authority in a great many jurisdictions throughout the 
land.
It is the case of Cohen v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 
113 N. Y.,
532, where the city had, by special permit, 
for which an annual
license fee was exacted, allowed a grocery company 
to leave its
wagon, when not in use, standing near the 
curbstone night and
day. The shafts of the wagon were held 
perpendicular by
strings attached to the body of the wagon. 
A passing ice
wagon struck the grocery wagon and 
turned it partially
around, the impact of the blow breaking the 
strings and thus
causing the shafts to fall on the head of the 
plaintiff's intes-
tate, who was passing at the time. It was held 
that the license
was issued without authority,' that the storing 
of the wagon
on the highway was a public nuisance, and that 
the defendant was
liable for damages just as if it had maintained the nuisance 
itself.
In the same jurisdiction, Wells v. the City of Brooklyn, 9 
App.
Div., 6i, a child was injured by the blowing down of a show 
case,
which had been kept on the sidewalk for a number 
of months by
a merchant, and it was held that the show case 
being permanent
in character, continuously maintained and unauthorized, 
consti-
tuted a public nuisance, which it was the duty of 
the defendant
to have removed as soon as the knowledge of its existence 
could
fairly be attributed to it, and that the city was 
liable for the
injuries suffered by reason of its negligence in failing to have it
removed.
But in Hunt v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 1o9 N. Y., 134, 
in
which the city authorized the laying of certain steam 
pipes by a
corporation, where an explosion of gas in one 
of the man-holes
injured plaintiff, it appearing that the laying of the steam conduits
caused the escape of gas from the gas pipes 
into the man-hole
where the explosion occurred, it was held that the 
city was not
liable; for the laying of steam pipes was a new thing 
and that, as
no such accident had ever happened before, it was 
not to be anti-
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cipated by the city, even though exercising due care and diligence.
However in Beall v. Seattle, 28 Wash., 593, where the circum-
stances were of a similar nature, an opposite view was taken by
the Court. In this case the explosion of a steam boiler beneath
the sidewalk caused the injuries complained of. The boiler was
maintained in connection with the heating plant of the abutting
building, where it had been installed for three months, and it was
claimed that the ordinance of the city, requiring certain inspection
by the proper authorities of any proposed heating plant located
beneath a sidewalk, had not been duly followed, that the defend-
ant had notification of the installment of the plant and was there-
fore put on notice as to the safety of its construction. It was
held in this case that where a traveler upon a highway is injured
as the result of the explosion of an unseen instrument, within the
area of the street over which the city has control, a prima facie-
case of negligence is established against the city, in the words of
the learned judge, "the explosion being a thing so unforeseen and
unexpected in its nature."
In regard to the liability of a municipality for injuries suffered
by reason of the negligence of a contractor or builder, in failing
to exercise due care and provide proper safeguards, where the
city has expressly permitted the use of a portion of its streets for
building material, etc., there also seems to be a conflict in the
authorities. In McCoull v. Manchester, 85 Va., 579, the city, by
virtue of a general ordinance to that effect, had allowed a builder
to block the street from the sidewalk to the center of the street.
The plaintiff, while riding his horse by at a moderate speed in the
night, ran into a pile of sand on which there was no light. The
horse fell and broke his neck and the plaintiff was also injured.
It was held that the city was liable, because of its duty to see that
lights were kept on such obstructions which, without lights, could
be easily anticipated as productive of injuries to travelers.
Whereas in McArthur v. City of Saginawz, 58 Mich., 357, it was
held that the unauthorized use of a public highway by an abutting
owner is a matter that falls within the cognizance of the police
power, and it has nothing to do with the duty to make or repair
highways. In this case the intestate of the administratrix, who
was riding in his buggy at the time, ran into a pile of lumber
extending into the street, was thrown from his buggy and killed.
The Court refused to fasten any liability on the city. And the
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same line of reasoning, under similar circumstances, is used by
the Court in Sinclair v. Baltimore, 59 Md., 592, while in Penrod
v. City of Columbus, 73 Ohio St., 209, it was held that the city was
not liable unless the failure of the builder to keep the streets
properly safeguarded has been expressly brought to the attention
of the city.
In King v. City of Oshkosh, 75 Wis., 517, the plaintiff sustained
injuries by falling over a hydrant maintained on the edge of the
sidewalk by a private corporation, with the consent of the city.
It was held that where the city suffers a dangerous structure, or
object, to remain upon its streets, after notice of its existence and
time for removal, it is liable for any injuries caused thereby. But
in Wolff v. Dist. of Columbia, 21 App. D. C., 464, it was held
that the municipal corporation was not liable for injuries caused
the plaintiff by falling over a horseblock on the sidewalk, the
street being poorly lighted at that point. And in Michigan it
was held that the city was not liable for injuries to a pedestrian
through the falling of a billboard, insecurely placed near the edge
of the street, upon his own property, by an abutting owner.
Timby v. Islipemiig, 14o Mich., 146.
It seems to be generally accepted that a municipal corporation
is not liable for injuries inflicted on travelers by bob-sleds and
other sleds used in coasting, regardless of whether the coasting is
allowed or prohibited by the city ordinances. Toomey v. City of
Albany, 38 N. Y. St. Rep., 91; Pierce v. City of New Bedford,
129 Mass., 534; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 2nd Ed., Sec.
981, N. 2.
And even where the instrumentalities complained of are per se
dangerous the authorities are at issue; thus, in Speir v. City of
Brooklyn, 139 N. Y., 6, the city was held liable for damages where
the plaintiff's house had been et on fire by a sky rocket, which
entered the window from the street below where a celebration of
fireworks, licensed by the city, was taking place; it being said by
the Court that the discharge of the fireworks, at the place and
under the circumstances, was a nuisance. While in Hubbell v.
City of Viroqua, 67 Wis., 343, it was held that the city was not
liable for injury to the plaintiff inflicted by a stray bullet from a
shooting gallery, licensed by the city. And in Massachusetts
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Lincoln v. City of Boston, 148 Mass., 588, the city was held not
to be liable for injuries of the plaintiff, whose horse had run
away, when frightened by the discharge "of a cannon on the Com-
mons, under permit from the city.
The subject is very well summed up by the words of judge
Peckham in Hubbell v. City of Yonkers, 1O4 N. Y., 434, where he
says: "That which never happened before, and which in its char-
acter is such as not to naturally occur to prudent men to guard
against in its happening at all, cannot, when in the course of yers
it does happen, furnish good ground for a charge of negligence,
in not foreseeing its possible happening and guarding against the
remote contingency." While the reasoning of the learned judge,
as well as a very respectable line of authority, seems at first sight
at variance with the decision reached in this case, still an analysis
of the various authorities seem to show that the preponderance
of the decisions in America support the conclusion reached in the
principal case.
TECHNICALITIES IN CRIMINAL IROCEDURE-REVERSAL FOR INADE-
QUACY AND INEFFICIENCY OF COUNSEL.
The mere incompetency of an attorney does not ordinarily con-
stitute a ground for a new trial nor justify a reversal. There
must be a strong showing both of incompetency and prejudice.
The State of Iowa v. Benge, 6I Ia., 658. This strong showing
was proved to the satisfaction of the Missouri Supreme Court
in the case of The State of Missouri v. Lewis, (188o) 9 Mo. App.,
321. Here, after vainly attempting to have the case continued,
the attorney withdrew. The witnesses were not subpoenaed and
the investigation and all other preparation bad been entirely
omitted. The appointed counsel were unable to prepare the
defense in time and the Supreme Court reversed the case, saying
that the refusal of a motion for continuance was an abuse of the
discretion of the Court. "The gross ignorance, incompetence and
imbecility of the attorney of one accused of murder, by which the
prisoner is deprived of essential rights and advantages guaranteed
to him by law is sufficient ground for setting aside a conviction
and granting a new trial," says the Court in this case.
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But the incompetency, inefficiency or even ignorance of the
attorney for the accused prisoner is not a ground for a new trial
unless it clearly appears that the accused was prejudiced thereby.
Darby v. The State of Georgia, (1887) 79 Ga., 63. Here it was
held that although the chief counsel for the accused was so unwell
that he died a few days after the trial it was not a ground for
reversal based on the allegation that his ill-health prevented him.
from properly handling the case since it was not shown that differ-
ent conduct would have changed the result.
This case is in accord with a previous' decision where the counl-
sel for the accused in consequence of too free use of intoxicants
neglected to inform the defendant of his right to make a state-
ment to the court. It was held that there was no ground to jus-
tify a reversal as it was not shown that he had suffered material
detriment therefrom. Hudson v. The State of Georgia, (1876)
76 Ga., 727. But the court indicated that a reversal was not
impossible.
The case of People v. Blevins, (1911) 96 N. E., 214, raises a
novel question under this rule. The plaintiff was indicted for
murder and the indictment returned August 15, 1911, when he was.
arraigned and counsel appointed and trial set and had two days
later. Neither of his attorneys felt equal to the handling of this
case; one was in practice less than two years, and the other was
engaged in civil practice. The State was ably assisted by three
experienced counsel hired by outside parties, and it was held that,
on objection, the defendant was entitled either to have his defense
strengthened or the State's representation weakened so the con-
test would not be quite so disproportionate.
In The State v. Dreher, (1897) I 3 7*MO., 1I, the counsel failed
to handle his case in a manner satisfactory to the counsel on
appeal who claimed that "he did not see his witnesses before they
came into court; that he had not summoned proper witnesses; nor
properly handled a preliminary hearing on the question of the
insanity of the criminal; and also that he had placed experts on
the stand before his defense was properly or sufficiently devel-
oped; etc." The Court, basing their decision upon Fieldi v.
Matson, 8 Mo., 686, and Gehrke v. lod, 59 Mo., 522, held this was
not a sufficient ground for reversal. "After a most laborious
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search we have found but one case in which an appellate court
has reversed sentence or judgment on the ground of the negli-
gence or incompetency of an attorney," says the Court in this case,
referring to The State"of Missouri v. Jones, (1882) 12 Mo. App.,
93-
But it may be reversed on that ground. Kuehn v. The State,
(1905) 47 Tex. Crim. Rep., 636. But not unless it is well proven.
Vowles v. The Commonwealth, (1894) 15 Ky. Law Rep., 524.
Here, in the opinion of certain spectators, the attorney was not
well enough to try the case. But the reversal was refused.
Inefficiency caused by sickness is not generally considered a ground
for reversal. Darby v. The State of Georgia, (1887) 79 Ga., 63.
- And the same rule applies to intoxication. Hudson v. The State
of Georgia, (1876) 76 Ga. App., 727.; O'Brien v. The Common-
wealth (19o3) 115 Ky., 6o8, 24 Ky. Law Rep., 2511. The mere
failure or even refusal of the defendant's counsel to summon
certain witnesses is not sufficient proof of incapability. Fambles
v. The State of Georgia, (1895) 97 Ga., 625. And where the only
neglect is a failure to except to the ruling of the Court or to the
instructions to the jury, which did not appear to have prejudiced
the defendant, it is no ground for reversal. State of Kentucky v.
Currens, (1891) 46 Kan., 750.
Inefficiency due to lack of skill and inexperience is raised only
when the counsel is appointed by the Court. In such a case the
prisoner's counsel acts as a substitute for the judge under a sur-
vival of the maxim, "The judge is counsel for the prisoner." And
therefore his acts or omissions are to be more favorably construed
than if he had been employed by the defendant himself for his
defense. State v. Williams, (189o) 9 Houst. (Del.), 5o8. But
nevertheless where it is claimed that appointed counsel is ineffi-
cient it must be proven. Innocents v. The State, (1908) 53 Tex.
Crim. Rep., 390.
Where the accused person employs his own counsel he must
take proper precautions to protect himself before he can obtain
a reversal upon such grounds. Where the defendant's counsel was
so drunk that the court stopped the trial and gave warning to the
defendant that the attorney could not try the case in that condition
it was held that as the defendant continued to retain the same
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counsel there was no abuse -of discretion in the Court to refuse to
grant a new trial. Territory of New Mexico v. Clark, (1905) 79
Pac., 708. And where the defendant was tried for keeping a
disorderly house and he had disclosed only part of the facts to
this lawyer so that the attorney was not prepared to meet proof
that a tenant in the basement had so kept that part of the prem-
ises. It was held that the defendant had no ground for reversal
for surprise and consequent inadequacy of defense. People v.
O'Brien, (1854) 4 Parker Crim. Rep. (N. Y.), 203. In a Texas
,case where the attorney's condition due to sickness and ill-health
-was such that he could not try the case and the defendant then
made extraordinary efforts to secure other competent counsel and
failed, it was held an error in the Court to refuse to grant a con-
tinuance. Kuehn v. The State, (1905) 47 Tex. Crim. Rep., 636.
And also that where the attorney employed did not take up the
,case and the defendant in ignorance of his rights pleaded guilty
it was an error in the Court to refuse to grant a new trial when
be had a good defense. Jackson v. The State, (19o6) 48 Tex.
Crim. Rep., 373. And where the prisoner's counsel was hired
by- his mother and then appeared during the trial so intoxicated
that he was unable to fill his duties it was held that, while the
defendant might not be held with the same strictness yet the Court
-would refuse to reverse the case under the facts disclosed. O'Brien
-v. The Commonwealth, (1903) 115 Ky., 6o8.
It is nevertheless a condition precedent that the defendant avail
himself of all proper means for his protection. Where contin-
-uance or postponement or other opportunity for preparation is
-not sought at the proper time there is no ground for an appeal for
Tefusal to grant a new trial on the ground of inadequate prepara-
tion. State of Louisiana v. Walker, (1887) 39 La. Ann., 19. But
-where the defendant's counsel refrained from -asking a change of
-venue for local prejudice for fear of mob violence it was held
that under the circumstances it violated the prisoner's constitu-
tional right "to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury-and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense," Roper v. The
Territory of New Mexico, 7 N. M., 255. Where the question of
-sufficiency of preparation was not raised until after the verdict,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana could find no reversible error.
State v. Bradley, (1851) 6 La. An'n-, 554.
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It therefore seems that while the weight of American authority-
is not in favor of granting a new trial on the assumption that the-
defense was not sufficiently strong yet there is a sharply defined
line beyond which we cannot go. The case of People v. Blevins,.
supra, is one very close to the dividing line and might be justly
decided in either way but the including of the weakness of the
defense in the assignments of error is fully justified" both on pria-
ciple and authority.
THE EFFECT OF A PAROL AGREEMENT LOCATING A BOUNDARY
BETWEEN ADJOINING ESTATES.
Throughout the history of this country uncertain and disputed
boundary lines have constantly given the courts of the various
States many cases for decision. As was to be expected, different
judges took different views of questions of law arising from sim-
ilar facts, and at first there was a wide variance between the laws
of a number of the States. Most of this diversity of opinion was
concerning the effect of a parol agreement between adjoining
owners establishing the location of a disputed or uncertain bound-
ary between their lands. Many of the earlier decisions were in.
direct conflict, entirely irreconcilable, but gradually one view came
into favor and was adopted by the courts of a large majority ofi
the States.
In Taylor v. Rudy, 137 S. W. (Ark.), 574, a recent case before
the Supreme Court of Arkansas involving the boundary question,
the plaintiff brought an action to restrain the defendant from
obstructing a stream of water which ran through the land of each,
alleging that such obstruction caused the water of the creek to
back up and overflow his lands, thereby causing much damage
to certain buildings and their contents. The defendant contended,
that these buildings were upon his land and not upon the land of
the plaintiff. The evidence showed that there had been uncer-
tainty as to just where the boundary line was located, and that by-
parol agreement the prior owners had fixed a boundary between,
their respective possessions, and had continued to occupy the lots
with reference to this agreement until the conveyance to the plAin-
tiff and defendant in this action. According to this division the
buildings stood upon the land owned by the plaintiff, and the only-
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question was whether the parol agreement vas valid and binding.
The Court held that it was and gave judgment for the plaintiff.
In the opinion the Court said that where there is uncertainty as
to the boundary or where the owners of adjoining lands are in
dispute as to the dividing line, the parol agreement of such owners
as to the boundary establishes the line, and when followed by pos-
session with reference thereto is conclusive on them. Payne v.
McBride, 131 S. W. (Ark.), 463, was there cited and the doctrine
as stated in that case is substantially the same, with the addition
that the possession with reference to the agreed boundary need not
be for the full period of the statute of limitations. In many other
jurisdictions this opinion is reiterated and regarded as settled law
therein, notably, Kitchen v. Chantland, io5 N. W. (Iowa), 367,
and Vosburg v. Teator, 32 N. Y., 561; but in some the rule is less
strict, the agreement alone being deemed sufficient without
acquiescence or possession. Patterson et al. v. Meyer, 114 Pac.
(Okl.), 256; Hastings v. Stark, 36 Cal., 122.
In all cases it is essential to the validity of the agreement that
there should be a dispute or uncertainty as to the line, and in
some, as already noted, there is the additional necessity of
acquiescence or occupation following the agreement. Concern-
ing the former it is said in 4 American and English Encyclo-
paedia, 859: "A practical location of the boundaries of two
coterminous estates by the act of the parties has been held to
determine the boundaries and fix the rights of the parties. A
limitation to the efficiency of this method of determining boun-
daries is found in the provision of the statute of frauds prohibit-
ing a parol transfer of title to land. The judicial expressions
upon this subject are not easily reconciled, but by the weight of
authority, in order to avoid the statute, the location must deter-
mine a boundary previously unascertained and uncertain; or
there must be an acquiescence in the actual location for a period
greater than the statute of limitations; or there must be an ele-
ment of actual estoppel in the case which will prevent one of the
parties from asserting his title." Thus it is said in Olin et al. v.
Henderson, 79 N. W. (Mich.), 178, that there must have -been
a doubt or controversy as to the true line; otherwise the case
comes within the prohibition of the statute. Where the boiin- ' "
dary is kiowfi and not in dou bt the agreement is void. Gilchri.t-,".
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-v. MvKee, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.), 456; Northern Pine Land Co. v.
-Bigelow and Another, 84 Wis., 157.
But what is the effect of the agreement where the boundary is
in doubt at the time it is made, but the true location is afterward
-discovered? Here there is a conflict of opinion. In some
States it has been decided that the agreement binds the parties
though it is not the true line, and though the true line is afterward
-determined. Provident National Bank v. Webb, 128 S. W.
(Tex.), 4.26; Loustalot v. McKeel, io8 Pac. (Cal.), 707. . Per-
Jhaps a greater number, however, have decided that where the
parties agree as to the location of the line thinking it the true one,
or where the true line is discovered after the agreement, the
.agreement is not binding and either party may claim up to the
true line. Gove v. Richardson, 4 Greenl. (Me.), 327; Jackson v.
.Perrine and Wife, 35 N. J. Law, 137; Bailey v. Jones, 14 Ga., 384.
This latter rule, as well as the one requiring acquiescence or
-possession, probably arose from the belief that the allowance of
these parol agreements was a judicially created exception to the
statute of frauds. This is now considered erroneous, and the
section of that statute forbidding a transfer of title to land by
-parol is held to be not applicable. In Hagey v. Detwiler, 35 Pa.
.St., 4o9, this is explained in accordance with the weight of author-
ity as follows: "It is supposed (by counsel) that boundaries fixed
by parol are within the operation of the statute. This is a mis-
-take. The statute is a rule of conveyance; it requires a writing
to create an estate or interest in lands, that shall have more force
,or effect than a lease or estate at will only. But adjoining owners
who adjust their division by parol do not create or convey any
-estate whatever between themselves; no such thought or intention
influences their conduct; after their boundary is fixed by consent,
they hold up to it by virtue of the title deeds, and not by virtue of
a parol transfer. Generally, indeed, they feel that their rights
as defined in the title papers, have been abridged rather than
enlarged by the agreed line; and this, because their treaty pro-
-ceeds on the basis that the exact right between them is doubtful.
Out of the doubtfulness of the right springs the consideration
which binds the parties to such agreements." Again, in Vosburgh
-v. Teator, supra, "It may be regarded as settled law at this day,
that the settlement of a disputed boundary line between the parties
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by-arbitrament or parol, and especially where equivalents of ben-
efit or advantage are mutually received and acted on, will bind
the parties to it, not by way of transferrnig title from one to the
other, which the statute of frauds prohibits, but operates by way
of estoppel."
The courts almost universally have now adopted the view
expressed in the above cases. But formerly not a few judges
refused to give effect to a parol boundary agreement because they
looked upon it as a transfer of title within the statute. Phillips
v. Eades, i Ky. Law Reporter, 425, is a case in point. There it
is said that while a parol agreement as to the location of a boun-
dary would'be within the statute of frauds, yet such agreement
would conduce to show that such was the true line. Small v.
Hamlet, 24 Ky. Law Reporter, 238, and Campbell v. Combs, 25
-Ky. Law Reporter, 1643, are to the same effect, but they now
stand almost totally unsupported by authorities elsewhere.
In brief then, the law, as supported by the better opinion and
the weight of authority, may be stated thus: Where between
adjoining landholders there is a dispute or uncertainty as to the
location of a boundary line, they may make an oral agreement
establishing the line and it will be binding upon them, at least
when followed by acquiescence or possession, though such pos-
session need not be for the period of the statute of limitation of
actions. Furthermore, it should be added, that "the agreement
may be express or implied," Clayton v. Feig, 179 Ill., 554; 54
N. E., 149, and is binding not only upon the parties, but also upon
those holding under them. Hastings v. Stark, supra, Taber v.
Hall, 23 R. I., 613. Though it has been held that if unrecorded
it is void as to innocent third persons without notice. Kittridge v-
Landry, 2 Rob. (La.), 72.
So it must be concluded that Taylor v. Rudy, supra, was,
decided in accordance with the great weight of authority; that
the agreement made by the contestants' devisors was valid and
binding, and, therefore, that the decision for the plaintiff was cor-
rect.
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MEASURES OF DAMAGES FOR THE WILFUL BREACH OF A CONTRACT
FOR WORK AND LAROR.
Considerable dispute has arisen as to the right of a servant or
employee to recover for his services when he has quit his employ-
ment before his term has expired, and without any justification.
In the recent case of Hedges v. Slaughter, 13o S. W. (Tex.
Civ. App.), 592, the Court of Appeals of Texas reaffirmed its
previous doctrine regarding this question. The plaintiff in this
case had contracted with the defendant to perform certain ser-
vices. The plaintiff left the defendant's service without any
justification and before his term had expired. The court held
that where an employee abandons his contract he may recover the
reasonable value of the work performed, not exceeding the con-
tract price, less any damage sustained by the employer, regard-
less of whether the services were of actual value to the latter.
The foregoing doctrine has been repudiated by a long line of
decisions, both in this country and in England, but "the reason of
the thing and the trend of legal development are clearly in favor
of it." Scott, Cases on Quasi Contracts, 761.
The leading case in support of the doctrine that a wilful and
inexcusable default of the servant is no bar to his recovery is
Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H., 481. The measure of recovery
allowed the plaintiff is the value of his services as against the
damages sustained by the defendant for his non-performance.
The Court states in the opinion, "We think the technical reason-
ing, that the performance of the whole labor is a condition pre-
cedent, and the right to recover anything dependent upon it; that
the contract being entire there can be no apportionment; and that
there being an express contract no other can be implied, even upon
the subsequent performance of service, is not properly applicable
to this species of contract, where a beneficial service has been
actually performed; for we have abundant reason to believe that
the general understanding of the community is that the hired
laborer shall be entitled to compensation for the service actually
performed, though he do not continue the entire term contracted
for, and such contracts must be presumed to be made with refer-
ence to that understanding, unless an express stipulation shows
the contrary."
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That the present doctrine is based on justice and right upon
principle, hovever technical the common law may have been,
seems to be the opinion of Chitty on Contracts, 846. "It is dif-
ficult to discover a reason emanating from any principle of equal-
ity or justice for holding that a servant who has been wrongfully
dismissed by his master before his term has expired shall be held
to allow for other eligible employment he might obtain during the
residue of his term, which would not on the other hand require
that the master, when the servant has wrongfully deserted his
service, should procure the services of another, servant to fulfill
the same employment, and tlhen allow to the former the amount
agreed to be paid, after deducting therefrom the wages paid to
the latter and any damages and trouble suffered in consequence of
the change of servants and procurement of a substitute."
In all of the cases in support of the above doctrine the courts
have not been unmindful of the fact that when a person makes
a fair contract he is entitled to have it fully performed, and if
the plaintiff has wilfully refused to perform, the defendant should
be entitled to damages. In Britton v. Turner, supra, judge
Parker, in referring to the benefit and advantage which the
employer takes by the services, states that it is to be determined
as follows: "The amount of value he receives, if any, after
deducting the amount of damages; and if he elects to put this in
defense he is entitled so to do, and the implied promise which the
law will raise in such cases, is to pay such amount of the stipu-
lated price for the whole labor as remains, after deducting what
it would cost to procure a completion of the residue of the ser-
vice, and also any damage which has been sustained by reason of
the non-fulfillment of the contract."
Some courts have held that to allow no recovery on a quantum
.neruit would in effect operate as a forfeiture and in the nature
of a penalty. In Fenton v. Clark, II Vt., 157, the Court said:
"The theory on which it is based is not that it is the object of the
law to punish the party for a violation of his contract, but to make
the other party good for all-damages he may sustain by such vio-
lation. Common justice should require that plaintiff should
recover what defendant has been benefited, after deducting all
damages he might have sustained by reason of such contract."
COMMENTS
The opposite view, to the effect that the employee cannot
recover, is apparently based upon the theory that the contracts
are entire and the performance of them is a condition precedent
to the right of the servant to recover. Some of the courts base
their decisions on the doctrine, expressum facit cessare taciturn.
Davis v. Maxwell, 12 Metcalf, 286, held that the plaintiff cannot
abandon his express contract and resort to an action for a quan-
turm meruit on an implied assumpsit.
The rule that implied promises do not- exist where there are
express stipulations is not without exceptions, but where the fail-
ure to perform the express contract is intentional, it is such bad
faith that he can recover nothing. Metcalf on Contracts, 8.
Performance by the servant is a condition precedent to the
master's liability, and he cannot recover on a quantum ineruit,
because an express contract always excludes an implied one in
relation to the same matter. O'lmstead v. Beale, 19 Pick., 528.
In order to recover under contracts for wages in which there
is a specified length of time the courts sustaining this doctrine
have held that the plaintift must show full performance on his
part or a release by. his employer or some justifiable cause for
leaving. Such contracts are entire. He cannot sue on the
express contract, because performance is a condition precedent
to the master's liability. Thrift v. Payne, 71 Ill., 408; Lantry v.
Parks, 8 Cowen, 63.
"Mutual promises may be the whole consideration for each
other, but it may nevertheless appear either expressly or impliedly
from the nature of the contract that one is to be performed before
the other. The promise which is to be first performed is
independent, and the promises may enforce it or sue for its breach
without having performed or offered to perform. The perform-
ance of the latter is conditional, that is, performance by the other
is a condition precedent to any liability to perform it." Clark on
Contracts, 669.
The granting of a quasi contractual remedy in these instances
has been criticised, in that to allow such would be to encourage
the breach of contract. "It would seem that a sound policy would
require the courts to establish in the case if a wilful breach of
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conditions implied in law the same rule as exists in the case of
express conditions. To do otherwise would be to put a premium
on breach of contract." Keener on Quasi Contracts, 232.
It has also been held that a court of equity has no more power
than a court of law in such cases, and therefore cannot relieve a
party from the consequences of his wilful non-performance.
Mallory v. Mackaye, 92 Fed., 749.
From the cases it would appear that the weight of authority is
decidedly in favor of the strict doctrine, that there can be" no
recovery where the servant has unjustifiably quit his employment
before his term has expired. There are a number of jurisdic-
tions, however, which sustain the opposite view, that there may
be a recovery on quantum ineruit, nptwithstanding the fact that
there is a legal contract in existence. Undoubtedly a tendency
is manifest on the part of the courts to disregard the more strict
rules of the common law and adopt those which justice and equity
demand, and upon which the Texas court placed its decision in
the principal case.
